I. Introduction

For generations the peoples of Chechnya have been inhabitants of a conflict-ridden and suppressed land. In many ways, the identity of its people has been shaped by the series of atrocities that have plagued them. From the early conquest of the North Caucasus by Imperial Russia to the violations of human rights under the Russian Federation, the Chechens have treaded a gloomy path. Both historically and presently, the identity of the Chechens has been influenced by their Islamic faith. The influence and impact of religion on the identity of the Chechens has been dynamically related to critical events in their history. This paper sets out to explore the dynamic relationship between the faith of the Chechens and the longstanding oppression of the Chechen people by various Russian regimes. In this exploration of Islam and the Russian treatment of Chechnya, this paper will show how Chechen Islam has gone from a component shaping Chechen identity to being its very constitution.

II. Background: A History of Religion, Oppression, and War

Chechnya is a landlocked Russian Republic located in the northern slopes of the Caucasus region. It shares a border with the independent state of Georgia to the south and other Russian Republics make up its remaining neighbours. Chechnya covers an area of just over 6000 square miles. Its population is around one million people, consisting approximately 150 clans or teips, the majority of who adhere to some form of Islam.[1]

Though Islam is the dominant faith in Chechnya, arriving only in the late 16^th century, it is a relatively new component in the breadth of Chechnya’s religious history. Moreover, it was not until over a century after its arrival and acceptance in lowland areas that the more mountainous tribes of the south converted. Even as Islam eventually prevailed among the Chechen highland tribes, many of the pre-Islamic Christian influences that had arrived as early as the 6^th century remained.[2] Furthermore, as with Christianity, when the Chechens converted to Islam many of the traditional “…pagan beliefs survived despite their obvious clash with Islamic ones.”[3]

Sufism was, and continues to be the interpretation dominant in Chechnya. With its much less legalistic interpretation of Islam, focused more on the interior spiritual life and rituals, Sufism “…won the hearts of the educated and non-educated alike by its spiritual vision and ritual practices, as well as by its more inclusive, accommodationist, and syncretist tendencies.”[4] As traditional religious practices in Chechnya were fused with Islamic faith, the traditional identity and the Islamic religion became inseparable components. This implied, traditional Chechen identity and Islam are mutual constitutive components, both having analogous implications for how the average Chechen identifies his or herself. The ‘syncretist’ tendencies of Sufism allowed this fuse to occur.

In many ways, Sufism is much less obtrusive towards existing cultural practices allowing many of them to be modified or remain even with conversion. While Sufism has been described as an Islamic interpretation of ‘mysticism and pacifism’,[5] it has been indicated “Sufi brotherhoods have also provided significant organization and support for movements of resistance to colonial rule throughout the Muslim world, especially in the 19^th century.”[6]

It was in the 19^th century that Chechnya fought its second resistance movement against Imperial Russia under the leadership of now political and religious icon Imam Shamil. The first resistance movement was in the in the late 18^th century under Sheikh Mansur.[7] Chechnya became famous throughout Eurasia for its brave and ferocious warriors during these conflicts. While there is differing evidence regarding the duration of the conflict, one comprehensive report indicates, “In the Caucasian Wars, the peoples of the North Caucasus held out against Russia for almost 40 years and it was not until 1865 that the region was fully ‘pacified.’”[8]

In expressing the salience of Islam in these early conflicts as a stimulus for the Chechens and also as a motivational factor for Russian opposition, another author states, “Russians could not exert influence on the Sufi brotherhoods and therefore always suspected in their mystic rituals an anti-Russian sentiment. This explains why throughout history the Russians led a relentless and uncompromising fight against the murids (members of the Sufi brotherhoods).”[9] In the following decades the Russians continued with relentless fighting and suppression of Islam as they tried to keep Chechnya under their control.[10]

Under the Soviet Union Chechnya continued to be grounds of contention as the Soviets implemented policies directed towards the de-Islamisation of the Caucasus.[11] These policies were largely unsuccessful and actually fomented the predominantly Islamic faith of the Caucasus, particularly those residing in the more mountainous highland regions of Chechnya. As early as 1927 a geographer indicated that “Pan-Islamic…trends and attitudes have tended to ferment a political and economic confusion, which has expressed itself in innumerable conflicts…”[12] This assessment, which was made more than eighty years ago, is quite significant as it sheds light on the contentious situation that was occurring in the Caucasus under early Soviet rule and the subsequent confusion that lead to increased religiosity and violence (or vice-versa). It was shortly after this that Joseph Stalin organized the mass deportation of thousands of Chechens to Siberia and central Asia between November 1943 and March 1944 under the suspicion of Nazi collaboration. As many as 200,000 died in the deportation, the rest were allowed to return to Chechnya under Khrushchev in 1957.[13] Many returned with a heightened sense of nationalistic and religious identity that would help to partially unify the 150 Chechen teips.[14]

The first Chechen war began in 1994. Around 35,000 Russian troops were sent to Chechnya to combat an independence movement. The Russians lost thousands of troops and there was a great deal of suspicion regarding corruption in the Russian military as they sold arms, ammunition, etc to the Chechens. Grozny fell to the Russians in 1995 and Yeltsin arrived in person to announce to the troops that the war was over. This was a premature announcement as the conflict continued and the Chechen militants recaptured Grozny in August 1996. The loss of the Chechen war dealt a serious blow to the integrity of the Russian military and Federation. A peace deal was signed in the month of August that was set to postpone decisions of Chechen sovereignty until 2001.[15]

Building a stable government in autonomous Chechnya proved to be challenging. During the mid-1990s former president Dzhokhar Dudayev was in support of a secular Chechen state. He indicated that a theocratic Chechen state would look something like an Islamic Spanish Inquisition. However, under pressure from the populous he was forced to up the religious rhetoric in order to maintain political power and influence in a Chechnya where religiosity was strong and on the rise.[16] Quoting Souleminov, “In an interview he gave shortly before his death, Dudayev explained the essence of the country’s development: “Russia...has forced us to choose the path of Islam, even though we were not duly prepared to adopt Islamic values.””[17]

The conflict reemerged three years after the peace deal. Under Basayev, around 1,500 militants left Chechnya to fight for the unification of Chechnya and Dagestan.[18] This time the conflict took on an even more religious tone. It was faulty intelligence on part of these Chechen Salafi/Wahhabi[19] fighters that lead them to believe that their efforts would be embraced by a conservative Islamic Dagestan that was ripe for revolt against Russia. Upon the occupation or ‘liberation’ of a town or village, the people they encountered were not supportive of the Chechens. This was much to the dismay of the Chechen Salafi/Wahhabi fighters.[20]

Many Dagestani sided with Russian troops to oppose the Chechens and were successful in doing so within weeks. This event, along side a campaign of spurious bombings in Moscow in August 1999 that were attributed[21] to Chechen militants, would mark the beginning of the Second Chechen war. On 30 September 1999 Boris Yeltsin launched an ‘anti-terrorist’ campaign with 90,000 Russian troops being sent to Grozny.[22] Thousands have died since.

            Vladimir Putin became acting president after Yeltsin resigned on 31 December 1999. He vowed to continue with military force in Chechnya and claimed that he would restore the ‘integrity’ of the Russian Federation. The Russian military had encircled Grozny by early December and in February of 2000 they seized the city.[23] The conflict continues as Putin bequeaths power to his successor Dmitry Medvedev. It is likely that the Medvedev government will continue with Russia’s ongoing part in ‘the global war on terror’ against radical Islamists in Chechnya and other Republics. The Russians have been verbally ‘criticized’ harshly for their action in Chechnya with its gross human rights violations.[24] To this day many of the policies continue on the same trajectory.

III. Identity, Islam, and Chechen Survival

In speaking of the concept of man and faith, the twentieth century theologian and political commentator Richard Niebuhr declared that, “It is his disposition as a whole; or-more commonly-it is his several dispositions, so that we more accurately speak of a man’s faiths than of his faith...”[25] This quotation speaks to Chechen identity in two ways. Firstly, the Chechens are by and large people of Islamic faith. And secondly, the Chechens identify themselves with both their national identity and their Islamic identity. To speak of these as separate components may be an inadequate assessment. The Chechens have faith in themselves as a nation of people and also faith in their Islamic faith. One author suggests that “…the symbiosis is so strong, and in a sense so ‘natural’, that one could say there is no nationalism without Islam and no Islam without a national element in Chechnya.”[26] The two elements are in a dynamic relationship that is inseparable as they are in many ways one in the same. They are the Chechen ‘faiths’, and they are how the Chechens identify themselves.

Identity is undoubtedly an important component in understanding any people group. Here ethnic identity is defined as: “a set of solidarities, validated by a subjective belief in common origins and by socially differentiating cultural signs like language, myths, beliefs, customs.” [27] Whether identities are given, instrumental, or constructed we know that they exist.[28] Moreover, identity has been shown to be integral in shaping how individuals act within the political sphere.[29] Adding to this, religious identity has been one of the most powerful components for forming collective group identities and motivating political action, both violent and non-violent.[30] Though religion has a very rich history in Chechnya, the Chechen identity was initially based more on common language and shared history.[31]

         Identities are based on narratives that are often rooted in shared language and the past. “They involve a rewriting of history to make sense of the present, to create and maintain a community of destiny.”[32] Many Chechens have viewed themselves as, “…God's chosen ones…Others deemed Chechnya and the Chechens as the core of the Islamic world’s, or even all of humanity’s, progress.”[33] As a result of the atrocities committed against the Chechen people, and also the resilience of religions under oppressive circumstances, the Chechen ethnic identity began to change and become more based on this Islamic identity.

          Identities change as people attempt to reinterpret their circumstances.[34] The treatment of the Chechens by the various Russian regimes has forged an identity that Campana describes as ‘dual’, “On the one hand, Chechens were Sovietised and secularised: on the other hand, they were preserving their customs, language, and traditional ways of life in tight family structures and underground Sufi brotherhoods.”[35] She asserts that the targeting of the Chechens as a result of their being both Chechen and Islamic created a solidarity among them. This lead to the creation of unified nationalistic tendencies in the face of a common enemy.[36] Often times the unifying force was Islam, as this was a component of Chechen ethnic identity that was often most heavily suppressed and remained the most resilient. In light various types of oppression that removed Chechens from their land, destroyed their formal religious institutions, killed their leaders, etc, one author has indicated that, “What after all could the people turn to if not religion?”[37]

This ‘turn to religion’ could be viewed as a phenomenon. Or, one could see this as a rational choice. If looked at as a phenomenon, the ‘turn to religion’ seems to be a rather irrational-spurious decision based on fear or hopelessness. When seen as a rational choice, the ‘turn to religion’ seems much more sensible. Religion was indeed a part of the fabric of Chechen identity prior to Russian suppression.[38] Under oppressive circumstances Islam remained to be practiced in clandestine communities.[39] Islam was an institution, though quite informal for several years, which proved to be resilient to a variety of oppositional forces including war, deportation, occupation, and religious suppression.

When Islam is viewed as a powerful and resilient unifying force, it seems that a ‘turn to religion’ is a rational move based on intuition and sound perception of circumstances. The Chechens turned to Islam in order to ensure survival in the face of the much stronger Russian opponent, as it proved to be a resilient component of their identity. This is not to say that identity, or religious identity, is invariably a construct formed to ensure some sort of Hobbesian survival, but in this particular case, and under these particular circumstances, it is very likely.

IV. Revival and Division, Identity and Islam

Many authors speak of an Islamic revival in the late 1980s and early 90s. Despite different reasoning to describe this revival by scholars, it is important to note that it is generally agreed a revival of Islam occurred. According to some authors the revival was largely due to economic disparages and decline of Soviet power in the area during the perestroika period and the subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union.[40] Devastating socioeconomic conditions left Islam, particularly newly imported radical interpretations, as an oasis of hope for many Chechen youth. [41]

Some have pointed specifically to the arrival of Wahhabi/Salafi doctrine in the late 1980s and its coercive power, and also the ‘politicization of Islam’ in the mid 1990s to explain the religious revival.[42] In December of 2007 Alexander Knysh said, “Over the past fifteen years, many Muslims from the Caucasus, have been travelling to the Middle East…upon their return to their republics, many of them became disseminators of new forms of Islamic ideologies, sometimes referred to as ‘neofundamentalism.’”[43] Knysh, whose specific area of interest in the Sufi/Salafi divide, insists that the majority of those in opposition to the Sufi interpretation are among the younger generation. These young radical adherents refuse to marry, worship, and even socially interact with the Sufi adherents as they are viewed as being believers in a corrupt form of Islam. For these Salafi/Wahhabi, the Sufi interpretations of Chechen Islam are simply a guise for polytheistic traditional Caucasian faiths. Knysh concludes that, “Salafi Islam’s claim to “purity” is a convenient way to express its followers’ protest against the social status quo, which has always favoured the older generation, and demanded obedience from the young.”[44] In other words, Knysh suggests that the radical and violent interpretations of Islam are new phenomena in Chechnya that are being practiced by a new/young generation. Adding to this, this generation is coming of age under conditions that foster or ‘breed’ violent behaviour.

Neil Melvin indicates that, “By the time of Mikhal Gorbachev’s leadership, more than six decades of intensive anti-Islamic campaigns had institutionally and intellectually devastated Islam,”[45] which actually led to a revival of religion. While occurring alongside and often in conjunction with a rise in ‘nationalist sentiments’, he indicates that as a result of the collapse of the Soviet state and a weakened Russia, once clandestine yet srong religious communities could no longer be suppressed.[46] However, the resurgent religious communities were often divided among ethnic lines. The Salafi/Wahhabi were able to separate their movement from ethnic divisions by transcending them with a purely Islamic message. Indeed, they experienced their own internal divides, but many of these were quelled as the contending groups consolidated under repressive action from authorities in the late 1990s.[47] Melvin suggests that this has led to a ‘fragmentation of Islam’ between the traditional Sufi and the radical Salafi/Wahhabi. He indicates that, “The rift between traditional Islam and Salafist groups gradually emerged as the central political fault line.”[48] Division and contention remains between the traditional Sufi Islam interpretations of the area and the newly imported and more radical Salafi/Wahhabi doctrines.

Although contention between various groups and the theological/ideological divides exist between the Salafi/Wahhabi doctrines and the Chechen Sufi interpretations, some evidence suggests that this is a relatively marginal concern. Mayrbek Vachagaev, writer for “Chechnya Weekly” at The Jamestown Foundation, has indicated that Islamic radicals represent only a small minority within the resistance at around less than ten percent. While also noting that the process of radicalization is  “well under way”, he states that, “The majority of Chechens active in the resistance are adherents of a movement in Islam that is characterized by its mysticism and pacifism…” and for many “…the question of religion is not simply one of secondary importance but entirely irrelevant.”[49] Vachagaev also notes that, “Russia’s policy in Chechnya has become the main determining factor in the revival of Islam.”[50] With this evidence, it seems that the radicals could best be labeled as a ‘splinter group’ of a larger Chechen resistance movement that also identifies with Islam, but a less radical form.

         It appears that Vachagev’s assessment, as it implies that religion is both irrelevant and in a state of revival, is conflicting. This seems to be a reflection of the majority of scholarly literature, as various pieces conflict with one another in regard to the status of Islam, how Islam has shaped the Chechen ethnic identity, and how this has effected the development of violence and vice versa. Nonetheless, it can be concluded by an assessment of the literature on the conflict that Islam and identity are factors that need be examined in order to properly understand the Chechens and the continuing Chechen conflict.

V. Conclusion

As has been shown, oppressive Russian policies have been integral in explaining the ‘turn to religion’. However, whether or not this was a revival, something new, or something that already existed which is now receiving additional attention is a question that is up for debate. Even so, it can be said that Islam has been and continues to be a powerful force in shaping the Chechen ethnic identity. It is a force that has become evermore powerful as a result of Russian policies. Adding to this, radical interpretations of Islam have become increasingly popular among Chechnya’s young rebel fighters, [51] and the populous has demanded leaders to place Islam at the center of policies.[52] These factors, among others, exemplify the foundational status that Islam plays in how various Chechens identify themselves. Despite divisions in Islamic interpretations and some conflicting scholarly evidence, to suggest that the Chechen Islam has been dynamically or reciprocally shaped by ongoing violence and suppression is not contrived. Though there are contentious factions even within Chechnya, it has been shown that ethnic identity and Islamic identity are one in the same in the Chechen case.

Works Cited

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Richard Niebuhr, “The Widened Heart”, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 62, No. 2, April 1969, (pp. 127-54).

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Vachagaev, The Jamestown Foundation, “Chechnya Weekly”, Vol. 6, Iss. 3, 19 January 2005, (pp.1-8).

Tim Youngs, “The Conflict in Chechnya,” British House of Commons Research Paper, House of Commons Library, 7 February 2000, (pp. 1-28).