I. Introduction

The word ‘terrorism’, like many abstract political terms, is confusing, dangerous and indispensable.

-Adam Roberts

 

It has been the common perception of the Russian Federation that the Chechens are a lawless bunch of people that must be dealt with as such. Those Chechens fighting in the resistance movement against Russia are seen as terrorists by the Russian Federation. Different understandings of exactly how the Chechen rebels should be labelled have been implied however. For good reasons, some indicate that they are criminals; others think them to be terrorists, while others say that the Chechen rebels are freedom fighters.

 

This essay will begin by identifying the labels that the rebels will be categorized in. After this it will look at the context of the conflict a bit, followed by a section on some various theoretical assessments. The next section will shed light upon the implications that the terrorist label of the Chechen rebels has had the on rule of law. Upon engaging in these discussions, the subsequent section will clearly show how each of the assessments bears some degree of validity when one understands the various factions within the Chechen rebel movement-as there are divisions within it. This study should provide the reader with a more thorough understanding of the Chechen rebel movement as it attempts to separate and label some of the various factions within the movement at large.

 

 

II. Defining the Labels

When referring to the label of criminal, the type of rebel being referred to is one who is motivated by incentives that are, as Kalyvas states “personal-completely unrelated to the cleavage informing the conflict yet coded as such because of its external characteristics.”[1] For these rebels the conflict is about personal gains to be had by participating in violent acts. These gains may include land, profits, or possibly even long sought after intra-communal revenge. Kalyvas states that often times the conflict which one is participating in is used as a tool, as one can portray that they are apart of the larger fight on one side or another of an existing cleavage. This is a sort of guise used by criminals in order to avoid others from knowing actual personal motivations, as the population whom they seek at least implicit support from would see them as criminal motivations.[2]

The 2004 UN High Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change defines terrorism as any act, “…that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.”[3] The definition for terrorist that will be used in this essay is borrowed from Roberts[4] and the UN definition provided above. It is as follows: an individual or group motivated by ideology that systematically uses violence against civilians or structures which aims to insight fear that would lead to compliance on part of a people group, Government, or institutional authority.

The more romanticized view of a rebel is the one of freedom fighter.[5] On the eve of the American war for independence from Great Britain, Patrick Henry declared, “I know not course others may take.” In doing so he managed to rouse several listeners to take up arms with him. Now American icons, Henry and others like Sam Adams were labelled as terrorists by Great Britain. This example is given to elucidate the fine line between terrorists and freedom fighters. Indeed, where one sits is where one stands on this issue. Situational characteristics aside, freedom fighters are defined here as: rebels using tactics of asymmetric warfare who are in opposition to a larger institutional force on behalf of the independence of a people group from a foreign ruling power.[6]

There is obviously a divide among researchers on how the Chechen rebels should be portrayed. It seems however that each side may bear a degree of validity in their differing assessments. There are indeed criminals and acts of terrorism committed by Chechens. However, there are what also seem to be guerrilla insurgents-or freedom fighters. They employ traditional tactics of asymmetric warfare. The line between asymmetric warfare and terrorism is also one that is quite thin and with certain overlapping characteristics. This is a factor that needs closer examination and will be returned to later in the essay.

III. Some Background

Upon encircling Grozny on 7 December 1999, Russian Federation troops began dropping leaflets indicating,

The united troop command gives you a last chance. Until December 11, there will be a safety corridor through the village of Pervomaiskoye.  Those who remain will be viewed as terrorists and bandits. They will be destroyed by artillery and aviation. There will be no more talks. All those who do not leave the city will be destroyed. The countdown has started.[7]

 

Withstanding heavy criticism by world leaders Russian troops bombarded the city. As indicated in the leaflets, Russian troops were quite indiscriminate in who they targeted upon besieging Grozny. There are no definitive numbers of civilian casualties in this Second Chechen War, however it was estimated almost a year ago that around 25,000 have been killed since the conflict began in 1999.[8] It must also be remembered that this was in addition to the approximately 20,000 casualties of the First Chechen War. The thousands who fled Grozny mostly went to Ingushetia. It is estimated that around 10,000 fled there in January 2000 alone.[9]

Very early on in the Second Chechen War the EU and US made an assessment and formal declaration on the crisis in Chechnya. It turned out to be quite predicative of the current situation as well. In a joint statement on 17 December 1999 it was declared:

We recognize Russia’s right to uphold its territorial integrity and to defend its citizens from terrorism and lawlessness, and we condemn terrorism in all its manifestations. But we believe that Russia’s military tactics in Chechnya are undermining its objectives, creating a humanitarian crisis, endangering innocent civilians…We call for an immediate and lasting cease-fire throughout Chechnya and a political dialogue that can lead to a durable solution to the crisis.[10]

 

The recommendations made in this declaration were not heeded by the Russian Federation. Boris Yeltsin, and later Vladimir Putin, expressed that statesmen abroad did not have a good enough understanding of the situation in Chechnya to criticize the policies that they were using to deal with problems there.[11] Then US president Bill Clinton stated in early December of 1999 that Russia’s policies in Chechnya surely “will intensify extremism.”[12]

As early as the year 2000 a report suggested that there might be links between Al-Qaeda and violent Islamic extremist movements in Chechnya.[13] However Vachagaev, a scholar on the Chechen conflict, has indicated in 2006 that there is not ‘a meaningful connection’ between the groups.[14] Though they have taken differing stances on the way that the Chechen situation need be dealt with, the Russian and US government maintain that there are links between Al-Qaeda and Chechen violent Islamic extremist movements.[15] Many see the targeting of the rebels in Chechnya by the Russian Federation as part of the ‘Global War on Terror’ formally waged by the US in 2001.

 

IV. Assessments of the Chechen Conflict and it Rebels

While the Russian Federation insists that it is fighting a ‘war on terror’ in Chechnya, Kalyvas indicates that the Chechen conflict is a civil war over secession. The primary cleavage in this conflict being based on rival territorial claims-although there is an Islamic extremist element on the Chechen side and terrorist tactics employed-surely it is a war over secession from the Russian Federation.[16] Resembling Kalyvas’ assessment, but with a stronger emphasis on the religious element, International Crisis Group has indicated that the situation in Chechnya is for many extremists irredentist, meaning “the struggle to redeem [their] land is considered to be part of Dar al-Islam from non-Muslim rule or occupation.”[17] This implies that Islam is important, however it is only important when in the face of a non-Islamic and in many ways anti-Islamic external occupying opponent-The Russian Federation. Some factions in the resistance movement align with the irredentist ideology and have employed terrorist tactics in attempting to achieve the goals of Dar al-Islam.

Similar to the Crisis Group assessment, but without the religious nature of Dar al-Islam rhetoric, Roberts suggests that foreign occupation can lead to terrorism. “Terrorists [he says] often focus on deep resentments based on perceptions of alien domination of the societies that they claim to defend.”[18] He continues later on, “To say that a movement responds to real grievances…is not to say that it is justified in resorting to terror, but it is to say that the terrorist movement reflects larger concerns in society that need be addressed in some way.”[19] Based on what has been shown regarding the atrocities of the First and Second Chechen War alone, it seems that there are surely some ‘larger concerns’ that terrorism may be a reflection of in Chechnya. These ‘larger concerns’ could also be motivating factors for freedom fighters, but may also be used as a guise for personal economic gains that can be had when participating in a conflict. This is a topic that will be returned shortly. Let us a look a bit more at the terrorism label and its religious insinuations.

For Kramer, the central issue in the Chechen conflict is deviance-terrorism and criminality alike. He shows that criminal gangs have been very supportive of terrorist gangs in Chechnya. Identifying several instances of terrorist acts attributed to the Chechens, he maintains that the rebels are terrorists and they employ terrorist tactics-often along religious lines-citing links to Hamas and other openly violent extremist Islamic groups.[20]

In opposition to Kramer’s assessment that the terrorists are committing acts of terror along religious lines, Speckhard has found in doing interviews with the families of 34 of 112 Chechen suicide bombers that the motivating factors for those ‘human bombs’ were more nationalistic than religious-though religion did play a role. Adding to this, the usage of suicide bombers, as an act of opposition to the Russian forces, is not socially accepted the way that it often is in Palestine in opposition to the Israelis.[21] Though suicide bombing has obviously no personal economic gains after the fact, it has been indicated in some instances that the families of suicide bombers are often cared for after the ‘sacrifice’ made by their kin.

This economic talk moves us to the all-important ‘greed argument’ put forth by Paul Collier that seems to explain the behaviour of the Chechen rebels quite adequately. The greed argument implies that the Chechen rebels are ‘conflict entrepreneurs’. They seek financial gains in the conflict through violent means while framing their actions as a response to various grievances. Rebels claim to be fighting a war on behalf of the general populous against an oppressive foreign power-Russia-be it in the name of Islam or revenge for past atrocities etc. The rebels frame their actions in this way to avoid being viewed as criminal, or simply greedy, by the populous who they claim to be fighting for. For rebels to frame their motivations as a result of grievances is good public relations.[22]

It must be noted that using grievance rhetoric for Collier is different than when used by Kalyvas. For Collier, grievances are never the true motivations for rebel fighting. Kalyvas on the other hand suggests that grievances are often used as a guise for various types of personal gains, greed included, while maintaining that this is still not an adequate means for describing the motivations of all rebels. Lastly, Collier’s theory indicates that rebels have a vested interest in the conflict continuing as long as possible for it is their source of income.[23]

Collier’s theory seems to provide an adequate understanding of the reasoning behind why the Chechen rebels fight. However, there are a couple of shortcomings that should be addressed. Firstly, an argument based on personal economic gains does explain suicide terrorism very well. This is said for obvious reasons. Additionally, framing arguments in a way that achieves good public relations implies that there are actually ‘larger concerns’ among the populous. With that said, it seems natural that many fighters, as they too were apart of the populous before taking up arms, took up arms as result of these ‘larger concerns’ or grievances. While recognizing that an individual rebel’s motivations may change over time, to imply that all rebels in Chechnya are fighting for personal economic gains is a bit contrived.

It has been indicated that when one goes and actually speaks to the rebels of various types, and their families, factors other than personal economic gain are found to be at play. Though some may be better labelled as terrorists, many will actually view themselves as freedom fighters with personal gains being a very inconsequential factor. Although the theory is quite convincing, and is in all likelihood a correct assessment of the motivations of some of the Chechen rebels, for the reasons just noted, one should remain sceptical of the explanatory power of the greed theory as a sort of meta-explanation for the outbreak and sustainment of the Chechen wars or all civil wars for that matter.

 

V. The ‘T’ Word and its Implications for Rule of Law

Whatever the motivations or justifications for violence of a particular rebel, there are indeed a multitude of issues raised by the lawlessness of the various factions in Chechnya and possibly parts of Russia proper. However, scholarly literature points to the ‘anti-terror’ policies employed by Russia to deal with the issues in Chechnya as being counterproductive, and in all likelihood the dominant cause of increased terrorist violence and lawlessness. Even almost a year before the 9/11 attacks on the US that spurred a snowballing in the usage of ‘terror’ rhetoric,[24] the language was used by the Kremlin to describe the Chechen rebels. This is significant because labelling the rebels as terrorists means that certain tactics are used. The tactics used to eradicate terrorists have dealt a heavy blow to the civilian populations in Chechnya and increased resentment for the Russians. These increased grievances among civilians, along with the inadequacies in the state building process, have lead many Chechens to join ranks with the rebels in Russian opposition and perpetuated distaste for the Russian Federation among non-combatants.[25]

This may go without saying, but negative sentiments go both ways. One scholar suggests, “Russian authorities in Chechnya have a groupthink mentality that portrays every Chechen as an enemy. In fact, the chief Russian army commander in Chechnya, General Shamanov, declared,  “even an unborn child in this region is a potential terrorist.”[26] These perceptions and labels have real implications for how dealing with the conflict is carried out on both sides. The Chechen rebels have demonized the Russians as an oppressive foreign power, and the Russian Army has dehumanized the Chechens as radical Islamic terrorists. This heightened distasteful mutual perception in Chechnya can more recently be traced to the implications of the terrorist label. The terrorist label has had adverse effects on the rule of law as Russia reasoned that since the Chechens are terrorists and don not respect rule of law they should not be treated with the respect that rule of law entitles.

It has been suggested that a respect for legal frameworks is an important element in combating a war against terrorism, or any other war for that matter.[27] Laws, though they differ from society to society, and culture to culture, usually reflect a desire to protect the people within. In combating an insurgent group, the larger institutional force often ‘breaks the laws’ of the particular society that they are operating in and international law by doing harm to civilians-whether it be with purpose or unintentionally. It has been suggested that both of these types law-breaking have occurred in the case of Chechnya. In addition to atrocities committed against civilians,[28] POWs in Chechnya are labelled as terrorists prior to their incarceration. They are not treated as POWs are supposed to be treated under international law. Instead, they are assumed guilty-as murderers, criminals, and extremists.[29]

This can be quite problematic, as the insurgency will often respond with similar or even worse tactics. We have for example the hostage situation at the Beslan hospital in North Ossetia in September 2004. In this crisis 330 people, 186 of them being children, lost their lives. This crisis has been attributed to the harsh economic and social ‘realities’ of the region, but also the corruption of police and military in Chechnya and their contribution to the ensuing lawlessness.[30]

The following statement is a somewhat speculative. It seems however that one side must ‘turn the other cheek’ in regards to tactical measures that breach rule of law. Continuing on the trajectory of ‘an eye for an eye’ in the Chechen conflict will surely not put a stop to the violence there. Instead, more rebels will likely join freedom fighter or terrorist movements. It is not likely that the most extreme rebels will be the first to adopt tactics that respect rule of law. Change will have to come from the Russian Federation, especially if they seek the loyalty of the Chechens. They will need enough loyalists to eventually drain the rebels of human resources. Although insurgents will often set the precedent for inhumane or unlawful tactics in a conflict, and continue even if formal institutions or states do not use them, it is the advice of some scholars that they take the ‘moral high road’ when combating rebel groups of various sorts and respect rule of law.[31] Adding to this, they should treat terrorists, criminals, and freedom fighters differently-as they employ different tactics and often have different motivations.

 

VI. The Three Groups: A Closer Look

Explanations for the why Chechen rebels fight varies. Surely this is because there are various reasons why each individual Chechen rebel fights. For some rebels it is about religion, for others it is nationalistic, while for many it may be a combination of the two. There are some rebels who are fighting for territory, some for revenge of past or current grievances, and of course for others fighting is a means of achieving personal economic gains.

It seems reasonable to take all of the above types of rebels and place them into groups based on their motivations and also their actions-or tactics. It would be insufficient to categorize groups or individuals based on rhetoric alone, as we have seen that in some cases rhetoric is used as a guise for truly self-interested behaviour. Adding to this, categorizing on actions alone may conceal actual motives. If we look at both factors however we can more properly label each rebel as belonging to one of the three categories defined in the second part of this study. Repeated, they are criminals, terrorists, and freedom fighters. Let us examine the way in which Campana has divided the Chechens based on what she calls ‘competing narratives’.[32]

Though Campana’s main concern is dissecting the ‘various trends’[33] within the Chechen national identity, the way that she has made the divisions will be quite beneficial in this attempt to label the different rebel groups in Chechnya. She identifies four groups, one of which is a group that is loyal to Russia. The focus will be on the other three as naturally the loyalists are not rebels.

Firstly, there are the separatists. The following quote form Campana sums up who this group quite well. She states, “According to the separatists’ viewpoint, the present conflict is a continuation of a war that started three centuries ago.”[34] It is a fight against the foreign occupying force-Russia-in its various forms, from Imperial Russia to the Putin administration. These rebels are mostly Muslims as most Chechens are Muslim, however, with their predominantly traditional Sufi Islam adherents, Islam for these rebels can be seen as more of a cultural characteristic.[35] Herein, the rebels ascribing to this ideology are labelled as freedom fighters. They employ traditional tactics of asymmetric warfare in order to fight a resistance against Russian influence and control on behalf of the populous. Naturally, the war tactics used by freedom fighters often have overlaps with terrorist tactics. They use the means available to resist the much larger and better-equipped Russian forces. This will sometimes look more like terrorism than warfare. We may infer that many of the suicide bombers in Chechnya whose families were interviewed by Speckhard are good examples of separatists employing terrorist tactics.

The other two groups share some similarities with this first group and may also be seen as derived from the separatists. Nonetheless, while there are similarities in goals and origins, there are also some fundamental differences; namely religious ones.[36] The next group that will be described tends to use more terrorist-like tactics and have differing ideological motivations than the separatists.

The second group that Campana identifies are the radical Islamists. She says of the radical Islamists, “Essentially, [they] gave a strong political visibility to an ideology few Chechens are following.”[37] Indeed, the voice of this group has been loud despite their minority status. Their strong visions, often irredentist in nature, have served as an attraction to many youngsters fed-up with the status quo and some of their leaders have managed to hold important political positions. However, it seems that the growing sway that this group is having with many young people is being matched by a growing distaste among the Chechen majority (who adhere to a moderate form of Islam) for the radical interpretations of Islam and the actions of its followers. This minority group is the one most often involved in atrocious activities and here they are defined as terrorists. This small group, which makes a disproportionate amount of noise, identifies the types of rebels that Kramer argued were the problem in Chechnya. Like the Russian Federation, Kramer probably overstated their presence.

The third group of rebels identified by Campana is the traditionalists. The traditionalists are most similar to the separatists. Where they differ is in their interpretation of what Chechnya should look like upon independence from Russia. They claim that Chechnya need not become a state in the modern sense of the word. Instead, it should be allowed to return to clan rule with Sufi Islam as a common denominator that will regulate laws and norms.[38] This group has not shown itself to be a powerful force by any means but it is worth saying that their rebels would probably best be classified as freedom fighters.

Campana does not provide a ‘competing narrative’ for criminal groups. More than likely, this is because criminals tend to borrow the rhetoric of other groups-always seeking a mask for personal gains. Criminals exploit the grievances that actually exist and in doing so create new ones in their lawlessness. One of the problems with the criminals in Chechnya is that Russian Federation officials, police, and Chechen authorities constantly undermine the already lacking rule of law there as well. For some, this may make that the acts of the criminals seem justified.

In dealing with the rebels, the freedom fighters should be negotiated with if at all possible. Meanwhile, terrorism and criminality should be curtailed using measures that do not breach rule of law. The current blanket label of terrorist and the tactics that it has implied have proven to be ineffective.

 

VII. Conclusion

This study has shown that the blanket label of all Chechen rebels as terrorists is not an accurate one. Moreover, the unlawful tactics employed by Russia in combating rebels-tactics that the terrorist label seems to justify-have only perpetuated an already grim situation in Chechnya. Drawing from various researcher assessments of the conflict it was possible to show the validity of each of the assessments in describing select rebels. These assessments also helped to show that making distinctions between the various rebels, labeling them as such, and dealing with them in ways that reflect these labels is one way of avoiding unnecessary breaches of the rule of law that lead to further violence.

 

A question to still be asked is, “How do we distinguish the criminals from the freedom fighters and terrorists if they are all using similar rhetoric and employing similar tactics?”  It is really not possible to answer this question accurately in all cases. Presumably the best way to know is to ‘follow the paper trail’. For example, if an individual or group claiming to be freedom fighters is making significant profits that are not being allocated for the purposes of the resistance movement, then it is likely that there is likely some criminality at play. Concerning those who claim Islamic irredentist objectives but are profiteering significantly on the conflict, ideology should be questioned as a guise. Though this is a difficult assessment to make, the current course of action, which labels all of the rebels as terrorists, is counterproductive.

 

Each of the assessments seems to bear some validity in explaining why select rebels fight. The freedom fighter seeks to drive out the occupying Russians and employ the tactics available to them to do so. A terrorist (in Chechnya) is motivated by an ideology that goes beyond the desire to drive out the Russians-concerned with Dar-al-Islam-and will employ whatever necessary tactics to do so. And although all the rebels are broadly defined as terrorists, these individuals are only a minority in Chechnya. Finally, the Chechen criminal often claims to be apart of the larger cleavage but is really concerned with personal gains.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

Ian Beckett, “Guerrilla Warfare: Insurgency and Counter-insurgency Since 1945”, in

                        Colin McInnes and G.D. Sheffield, eds., Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice, Unwin Hyman 1988, (pp. 194-212).

Aurélie Campana, “The Effects of War on the Chechen National Identity Construction”, National Identities, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2006, (pp. 129-48).

Paul Collier et al, “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy,” World Bank, 2003, (pp. 1-91).

Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy”, Department of Economics, Oxford University, April 2006 (pp. 1-26).

John Dunlop, “Putin, Kozak and Russian Policy toward the North Caucasus” The Jamestown Foundation, 2006, (pp. 1-15).

Executive Summary, “What Justice for Chechnya’s disappeared?”, Amnesty International, 23 May 2005, (pp. 1-5).

International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism,” Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37 , 2 March 2005, (pp. 1-35).

Stathis Kalyvas; Matthew Adam Kocher, “Ethnic Cleavages and Irregular War: Iraq and Vietnam”, Politics & Society, Vol. 35, No. 2, June 2007, (pp. 183-223).

Mark Kramer, “The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia’s War in Chechnya”, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 Winter 2004/05, (pp. 5-63).

Neil J. Melvin, “Building Stability in the North Caucasus: Ways Forward for Russia and the European Union”, SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 16, May 2007, (pp. 1-58).

Montgomery C. Meigs, “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare”, Parameters, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2003, (pp. 4-18).

Susan Rice et al, “Poverty and Civil War: What Policymakers Need to Know”, The Brokings Institution, December 2006, (pp. 1-30).

Adam Roberts, “The ‘War on Terror’ in Historical Perspective”, Survival, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2005, (pp. 101-130).

Mairbek Vachagaev, “The Chechen Resistance: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow”, The Jamestown Foundation, 14 September 2006, (pp. 1-24).

Tim Youngs, “The Conflict in Chechnya,” British House of Commons Research Paper, House of Commons Library, 7 February 2000, (pp. 1-28).