Introduction

There is a growing consensus in the international community that moving from being reactive to preventive is a more effective means of conflict management in both human and economic costs.[1] Furthermore, the international community is increasingly dependent on the private sector for conflict prevention (CP).[2] It may be too early to say if either of these trends will continue. This is said owing to the inattentiveness of governments to the private sector’s role in CP, despite its effectiveness and increasing influence in a variety of areas.[3]

The private sector has taken on an array of CP projects. These range from complex computerized early warning-monitoring systems to grassroots level educational workshops promoting tolerance. Indeed, these types of private sector involvement in CP play an important role in the larger effort to prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts around the world. However, it has been shown that third party mediation may be the most effective means of preventing conflict escalation and implementing the peaceful settlement of disputes.[4] Based on that premise, this paper seeks to identify how effective private-sector third party mediation (Track 1 ½) is in comparison to formal third party mediation (Track 1) in CP. It theoretically examines the two different means of third party mediation and their respective effectiveness in negotiation processes. This will be done by looking at the discourse on the psychology of mediation and the use of coercion, and this discourse as it has been applied to the mediation of violent conflicts. It is worth noting that the comparative assessment of Track 1 and Track 1 ½ is an extremely under-researched area with notable shortcomings in the existing body of knowledge.[5]

For the purposes of this study, specificities of individual conflicts will not be accounted for. This poses as a great limitation to how revealing the findings of this study may be as the particularities of each conflict are unique and have been shown to be of more than considerable significance in explaining their settlement.[6] Also of great significance, among many others, and only very lightly touched upon in this study, is ‘the importance of timing’[7] and the ‘environment’[8] when doing mediation. Some scholars have maintained that these factors are very decisive in determining outcomes. Nonetheless, the results of this interdisciplinary approach towards coercion and mediation in examining the attributes of Track 1 and Track 1 ½ should help to substantiate our understanding of the superior effectiveness of one or the other means of conflict mediation. Moreover, the discourse on this subject is becoming increasingly important as private sector involvement in various facets of CP is on the rise. This study should establish a foundation upon which the proposal of questions for further inquiry into these matters can be made.

 

The Use of Terms

As a preliminary, the meaning of certain terms will be made explicit. To begin, within the concept of third party mediation different approaches exist.[9] Moreover, these differing approaches depend a great deal upon the position, identity, motives, and also the leverage available to the third party.[10] The more traditional approach is usually identified by the usage of a formal representative. This type of approach is often times characterized as being ‘coercive’ in some way or another, as there is commonly additional threats or incentives introduced into the mediations on part of the mediator. Threats and incentives have commonly been referred to as ‘carrots and sticks’. This type of mediation, referred to as Track 1 diplomacy, was commonplace in the Cold War context and in many ways has dominated the realm of diplomacy in recent decades.[11] Presumably, decisions made by the conflicting political or governmental entities hinge upon threats or incentives that may be imposed by the government the mediator represents.

The utilization of an informal mediation representative (an individual from the private sector) characterizes the other type of mediation that will be identified, as it is the type that the former will be compared to. As late as the year 2000 some scholars recognized the role of the private sector in mediation but still paid little attention to it.[12] In the same year scholars of psychology were recognizing the private sector’s role as one of growing importance. They also ventured towards exploring how the psychological field could tell us more about human behaviour in negotiation processes.[13]

In essence, private sector third party mediation is distinguished from the former in view of its ‘non-coercive’ and subsequently more neutral stance. It has been termed Track 1 ½ mediation. Furthermore, this type of mediator is less powerful per se than a formal representative. Even without the sway of introducing tangible ‘carrots and sticks’, these mediators are likely to be distinguished and acclaimed world figures. Their identities are what give them leverage.[14] It is believed that the gravity of their involvement, as a result of their sheer distinguished acclamation etc., will affect negotiation processes in one way or another.

Scholars have defined conflict prevention, or CP as it is often called, in different ways. Notwithstanding, Ackermann (2003) identifies a growing consensus among scholars that CP must be more narrowly defined, especially in regards to different types of CP, namely operational and structural. Operational prevention, or sometimes referred to as ‘light’ CP, has traditionally been directed towards ‘imminent crises’ and often includes high-level negotiation and mediation, fact-finding, and even preventive deployments. Structural prevention, also referred to as ‘deep’ CP, most frequently refers to addressing ‘long-terms goals’ such as economic and political stability, education, and civil society building. Very often, the burdens of structural prevention lie with civil society and non-governmental organizations.[15] Though they are differing methods using different means, both operational and structural prevention are directed toward the same ends: the prevention of conflicts. Moreover, the two will often be operating in conjunction with one another. With that said, and although there is no consensus for an agreed upon meaning, the definition for CP used in this paper will be the very straightforward one provided by Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999): “actions which prevent armed conflicts or violence from breaking out.”[16]

Third party mediation falls under the category of operational CP. By virtue of the fact that third party intervention is most often used when there is imminent conflict to be averted, it is considered to be operational or ‘light’. Certainly mediation is ‘light’ in comparison to the structural or ‘deep’ prevention approaches that attempt to address issues that may be seemingly insurmountable strongholds deep-seated in cultures, societies, or states and prevent reconciliatory progress. Whilst it is  ‘light’, and may pose as less of a challenge than several structural or long-term approaches, the direct implications of operational third party mediation can be pivotal in deciding whether or not violence breaks out or protracts. The definition used to define mediation is that of Wall, Stark, and Standifer (2001): “assistance to interacting parties by a third party who may or may not have authority to impose an outcome.”[17] Adding to this, mediation is viewed as “a form of conflict management in which ultimate decision-making power remains with the disputants” (Moore, 1986).[18] Stating that decision-making power ultimately lies with disputants is not to say that third parties do not matter. Instead, I posit that mediation is a reciprocal process whereby which actions of mediators and the mediated have effects on one another that subsequently affect outcomes.[19] In short, mediation is the use of a third party in the settlement of disputes that may or may not use ‘carrots and sticks’ to influence decision-making processes.

 

The Discourse

Before engaging in the discourse, something integral to this study from the previous section will again be clarified. That is: Track 1 is characterized by a formal representative and considered to be coercive in most cases; and, Track 1 ½ is characterized by a private-sector representative and is most often non-coercive.

Some psychologists and other social scientists have indicated that mediators are most effective when they have certain characteristics. I have summarized them as follows: 1) they have experience in mediation and knowledge of the situation; 2) attitudes and identity are perceived by disputants with low partiality; 3) mediators have little or no tangible leverage over disputants.[20]

From the above perspective disputant behaviour/interests can be altered based upon certain mediator characteristics. Furthermore, implying that mediators who exert little or no tangible leverage over the disputants are more effective indicates that the more coercive use of ‘carrots and sticks’ may not be the most effective approach. Nonetheless, the ‘carrots and sticks’, or Track 1 approach, has most often been used. Psychologically speaking, it appears that Track 1 ½ is probably a more effective means of CP than Track 1. Regardless of a seemingly obvious conclusion for some there are other compelling perspectives that need be addressed and reflected upon. Adding to this, a reflection upon various perspectives will aid in more clearly developing claims for what may be the more effective means of mediation. I also remind that although Track 1 may have some shortcomings, one could presume that its record is good. As stated in the introduction, mediation has been shown to be the most effective means of preventing conflict escalation and implementing the peaceful settlement of disputes. Moreover, Track 1 is the approach that has dominated the sphere of mediation.

Continuing with the literature, there has been noteworthy work that deeply examines disputant behaviour in negotiation processes. One scholar has referred to this process as a phenomenon, though it is a phenomenon that should be better understood.[21]

In reference to theoretical psychological approaches rooted in game theory, it is postulated that disputants are ‘one dimensional’, that they seek only to maximise their own utility in negotiations (Roth 1995).[22] This is an interesting assessment that surely bears some degree of validity, especially owing to the fact that conflicting interests are very often in regards to tangible resources such as land, water, high-value gems etc. Simply put, disputes are often over economic interests. Some scholars have indicated that they are almost always causes of conflicts in one way or another.[23] This would certainly place conflicting economic interests as focal points in CP negotiation processes.

Psychologists have also found that scarcity of resources can be one of the greatest inhibitions to settlements of disputes.[24] Seemingly, the rational self-interest of each of the conflicting parties would be the most important issues to be dealt with in order to resolve a dispute if they are considered to be the causes of it. However, the problem with this rational self-interest sort of economic approach is that it does not shed much light on the three factors previously mentioned. 

The three mediator characteristics mentioned have been shown to bear considerable resonance in determining actor behaviour. Subsequently, they have been shown to be influential in determining the outcomes of negotiation processes. When actually negotiating, factors other than those that are seen as the cause of the actual dispute (possibly conflicting economic interests) become very important in determining behaviour and outcomes. Though utility maximization is certainly important, it should not be the only factor that is accounted for. This statement is further developed in the coming paragraphs.

During actual negotiation processes factors other than ‘one dimensional’ utility maximisation seem to carry a great deal of weight. As indicated previously, these include mediation environment, timing, partiality of the third party, tangible/intangible leverage etc. Some empirical work substantiates the validity of this more holistic approach. A particular controlled psychological study indicates that disputants are actually ‘multidimensional’, taking a variety of factors into account when negotiating (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992).[25] Another empirical study examining actual armed conflicts from 1945-1995 that takes several structural and negotiation context factors into account indicates strikingly similar findings (Jackson, 2000). Though understanding mediation and actor behaviour may be more complicated using a ‘multidimensional’ approach, it may provide for a clearer understanding of what really influences disputant behaviour in negotiation processes and how behaviour and interests change. These tests aside, the conventional wisdom among practicing psychologists is that whether or not negotiations achieve successful outcomes, in most instances exchange of dialogue improves disputant relationships.[26]

Another study that tests the behaviour of individual subjects, but in bilateral negotiation situations, has shown that coercion is much less likely to be used during actual negotiations. The study concludes that this is because disputants fear the losses that could result from the use of force more than they value the gains that could be made by using it (Molm, 1997).[27] This is largely due to the uncertainty of opposing disputant reactions to any type of coercion introduced. According to Molm disputants use ‘constraint’. Though Molm’s test is not an examination of disputants in violent contention, it does give us insight into human behaviour and furthermore CP. This is significant because as posited earlier, the phenomenon to be understood is humans, as their behaviour/decisions are what ultimately determines the outcomes of negotiations. Adding to this, it is another study which finds that disputant interests can and do change in the actual negotiation context and process.

The greatest shortcoming in Molm’s test may also be its most beneficial attribute. As only disputants are assessed, the shortcoming of Molm’s test is its failure to acknowledge the reciprocal role that an active and engaged mediator can have on the negotiation process. The attribute is that the findings may indicate coerciveness is often introduced or exacerbated by mediators. This is said because as the study found, people are less likely to use force than is often assumed. One could surmise that Track 1 can have negative consequences in light of its habitual introduction of additional coercive elements, or ‘carrots and sticks’.

There are other types of rationalistic approaches to assessing disputant behaviour that are indeed worth noting. One of which is the discourse on the importance of ‘relative power’ between disputants (DeDreu, 1995). [28] This discourse has looked at bilateral negotiation, as ‘bargaining through threats or promises’ and posits that level of power and use of threats or promises are ultimately the determining factors of outcomes. Contrary to one of four outcomes hypothesized, the DeDreu study revealed that there is less contention in negotiation processes when there is power balance between disputants than when there is power inequality. Its findings run similar to Molm’s. As power is somewhat neutralized when there is balance of power, in hindsight one could hypothesize that only when there is a perceived or actual power disparage does power (coercion) become influential.

This may add to our knowledge of negotiation processes more generally. However, as in Molm’s test, this approach does not take into account the reciprocal role that an active and engaged mediator has on the negotiation process. In light of the evidence indicating that third party mediation can considerably effect disputant behaviour and outcomes, and that it may be the best means of preventing and/or stopping conflicts, this factor should not go unaccounted for.

At this point, it has been made clear in preceding interdisciplinary assessment that certain matters are unavoidably important in understanding negotiation processes. To summarize the discourse to this point, this study has examined and linked different approaches and shown that 1) rational self-interest can become less pertinent and can change in the context of negotiation dialogue; 2) a more holistic approach to understanding disputant behaviour may be the most effective; and 3) though ultimate decision-making power lies with disputants, mediators play an integral role in shaping the outcomes of negotiation processes.

It has been indicated that conflicting economic interests is often the cause of disputes. For this reason, rationalist approaches have received increased attention in this study. However, psychologists and others have shown that rational interests, though viewed by some as the central point of interest for disputants prior to and during negotiations, change within negotiation processes. With that made clear in this analysis of existing discourse, the question that remains to be asked is: Why do the central causes of disputes become less pertinent and change at the negotiating table? In support of the Track 1 ½ perspective, the psychological response has mostly to do with the effects of the particular reciprocal relationship between disputants and mediators, the tendency for humans to fear using force when actually negotiating, and the likelihood for dialogue to improve disputant relationships.

From the Track 1 perspective, the changing behaviour of disputants is probably owing to the introduction of new factors that deter or allure. This approach maintains an appeal to rational self-interested behaviour. It attempts to divert attention from existing interests by introducing new ones and attempting to alter the status of existing interests in ways that fundamentally change them. This is the classic ‘carrots and sticks’ approach. In agreement with the non-coercive approaches, Track 1 places a great deal of significance on the role of the mediator. However, unlike Track 1 ½, the significance of the mediator has more to do with his or her ability to coerce than their ability to facilitate dialogue.

 

Conclusion

It seems that that at the crux of the issue with the Track 1 approach is its inability to recognize the significance of factors other than coercion that have been shown to influence disputant behaviour. This is in reference to the more holistic understanding of disputant actions that is not often taken into account or taken seriously by the coercive Track 1 perspective.[29] I remind that this is important to note because psychological and empirical assessments have shown that coercive approaches are often not the most effective forms of mediation. Despite its seemingly good record, Track 1 mediation may exacerbate disputes as additional coercive elements are introduced into situations that may otherwise have been solved by non-coercive mediation approaches.

Provided that studies of human behaviour and other work on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of coercive approaches to mediation are valid, the Track 1 ½ approach should be seen as the more effective of the two. Nonetheless, recognition of this is not likely by people in Track 1 positions at this time. However, as time passes and the statesmen of the Cold War era are replaced by new people norms may change. In addition to this, the expanding role of the private sector in a variety of CP areas may speed up this norm shift. At this particular point in time it remains to be seen what type of opportunities Track 1 ½ mediators receive to resolve conflicts and what the outcomes of those negotiations are. These outcomes will surely set precedents for the way negotiation and mediation is carried out in the future.

A more convincing postulation of the superiority of Track 1 ½ will have to come through exhaustive empirical rigour. A study of this sort could examine Track 1 ½ success or unsuccessfulness to date and compare it with Track 1 results. An effective study would take into account factors such as timing, previous behaviour of actors, whether or not recurrence took place, conflict intensity etc. Adding to this, it seems plausible that more exogenous factors such as the role of the media and its portrayal of the negotiation/mediation process should also be taken into account.  

 

Work Cited

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Jacob Bercovitch; Gerald Schneider, “Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 2, March 2000, (pp. 145-165).

Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy”, Department of Economics, Oxford University, April 2006 (pp. 1-26).

Cynthia J. Chataway, “Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective”, Negotiation Journal, July 1998, (pp. 269-287).

Carsten K. W. De Dreu, “Coercive Power and Concession Making in Bilateral Negotiation”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 4, December 1995, (pp. 646-670).

William J. Dixon, “Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement”, International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 4, Autumn 1996, (pp. 653-81).

Ronald J. Fisher, “Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution: A Review of Studies”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 2, June 1983, (pp. 301-334).

Tom Garling et al., “Diplomacy and Psychology: Psychological Contributions to

International Negotiations, Conflict Prevention, and World Peace”, International Journal of Psychology, Vol. 35, Iss. 6, 2000 (pp. 81-86).

Virginia Haufler, “International Diplomacy and the Privatization of Conflict Prevention”, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 5, 2004, (pp. 158-163).

Marieke Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation”,

The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2, June 1996, (pp. 360-389).

Maria Sperandei, “Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy”, International Studies Review, No. 8, 2006 (pp. 253-280).

James A. Wall Jr.; Daniel Druckman, “Mediation in Peacekeeping Missions”, 

The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 5, October 2003, (pp. 693-705).

James A. Wall, Jr.; Ann Lynn, “Mediation: A Current Review”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1993, (pp. 160-194).

Peter Wallensteen; Frida Möller, “Conflict Prevention: Methodology for Knowing the Unknown”, Uppsala Peace Research Papers, No. 7, 9 October 2003, (pp. 1-31).

Gilbert R. Winham, “Practitioners’ Views of International Negotiation”, World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 1, October 1979, (pp. 111-135).