Introduction

In 1995 there was a conflict between Peru and Ecuador over a historically disputed and recently acknowledged oil-rich territory in northern Peru. There are various theoretical claims as to why this interstate conflict broke out.[1] More notably, sceptics of ‘democratic peace theory’ propose it was a politically motivated conflict. They postulate that the heads of state in each of the nations decided to engage in a conflict over the historically disputed border in order to bolster popularity in a time of lagging approval ratings and upcoming elections.[2] There are also scholars who claim that this was an inevitable conflict resulting from the conflict-ridden history of the disputed territory dating back to 1802, somewhat of an ethnic hatred argument.[3] While these theories procure sensible theoretical explanations for the outbreak of the conflict, the explanatory power of lateral pressure theory may provide researchers with an improved understanding of the outbreak of the Ecuador-Peru border conflict in 1995 as it takes into account both material and non-material variables to identify why conflict is activated.

This study uses the operational tools of lateral pressure theory in an attempt to procure an improved theoretical understanding of the outbreak Ecuador-Peru border conflict of 1995. Part one of this study will provide a condensed account of the conflict situation under theoretical examination. The following part will provide an overview of the basic tenets and operational tools used in applying lateral pressure theory to conflict situations. Part three of this study will provide a chart of the necessary empirical evidence needed for the application of lateral pressure theory to the Ecuador-Peru border conflict of 1995. This part will also include an explanation of why the assumptions of lateral pressure provide improved theoretical understanding of the outbreak of the conflict. The conclusion will disclose possible shortcomings of the lateral pressure theory in describing the particular conflict dyad but also posit how the theory may be used predicatively in other conflict situations.

 

Part One

The Conflict Situation

Following a multilateral peace settlement in 1942 between Peru and Ecuador coined The Rio Protocol; there was general peace between the two states, which had been at odds for more than one hundred years. This multilateral treaty was intended to put an end to the oldest existing border dispute in the Americas. Aside from a few skirmishes between 1942 and 1995 by state and non-state actors respectively, there was peace in the disputed border territory.

In 1994 Peru opened its borders to outside investors. These foreign investors sent geologists to Peru and they discovered promising oil reserves in the historically disputed border territory along the Cenepa River. The reserves expected to potentially provide increased output of oil by Peru between 1994 and 2000.[4]  Oil was a resource that Peru had little of in relation to its northern neighbour Ecuador (oil being Ecuador’s leading export by a large margin).[5]

In 1995 an intense nineteen-day conflict broke out over control of the three hundred forty square kilometre region of oil-rich territory in Peru along the Cenepa River.[6] The Rio Protocol peace came to an end in January of 1995 as the first shots were fired between Ecuadorian and Peruvian forces. Ecuadorian soldiers had been gradually mobilizing for battle in the previous months with the intention of gaining the historically disputed mineral rich territory in northern Peru. After devastating initial losses, the Peruvian forces responded in full capacity. Peru successfully halted Ecuadorian military advancement into their territory by and large. Both sides suffered hundreds of casualties by late February and between the two states costs reached almost five hundred million dollars. Meetings between the heads of state took place almost immediately after the armed conflict began. As the conflict continued throughout January and February, leaders from both Peru and Ecuador conducted discussions in Montevideo. These discussions led to a ceasefire and further attempts to compromise the territorial mandates of The Rio Protocol. Peru remained in control of the disputed oil-rich region.

 

Part Two

Lateral Pressure Theory: The Basics

            Both Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North first proposed lateral pressure theory in 1972. These two scholars, among others, later developed the theory.[7] Lateral pressure theory seeks to understand the relationship between international and domestic behaviour by examining the uneven growth and development of the three master variables: 1) population, 2) resources, and 3) technology. It postulates that under certain conditions the interaction of these factors can be a notable precursor and indicator of potential conflict.[8] And, “…historical record seems to suggest that states which (due to rapidly advancing technology, and thus comparatively high levels of capabilities and a real and perceived need for additional resources) generate the highest levels of lateral pressure and fight more wars per country than other states.”[9]

            Lateral pressure theory postulates that conflict in the modern state system is often rooted in the uneven growth or development of three master variables, that these variables are highly interactive, and as a state has increased growth and development of one of the variables there is pressure to increase the growth and development of the other variables. For example, if the population (P) of state X increases, it will need increased amounts resources (R) and technology (T) to support its increased P. State X will attempt to increase its R and T from within its borders. If state X fails to do so, or if it would be too costly, then state X will attempt to acquire R and T from outside its borders[10] (state Y). Abstractly and simply put the theory looks something like figure one:

 

Figure One

(If P^ in X à X attempts to ^R and ^T from within X à If X fails à X attempts to ^R and ^T via Y) [11]

 

As states attempt to stabilize the growth and development of the three master variables from within their borders they are sometimes unable to do so without acquiring through lateral pressure either P, R, or T from within the borders of another state. And in most cases, pressure is put on a state within close proximity.[12] It is a rationally calculated self-interested theoretical viewpoint of state behaviour. However, the theorists recognize the limitations of this approach as the interactions of different state dyads can change from one to the next. This will be addressed shortly. Firstly, the proxies for measuring the three master variables will be made explicit.

            The method of measuring the three master variables is limited but the theorists recognize their limitations.[13] The measurement of population (P) is very straightforward. The proxy used to indicate technology (T) is GNP, as “…the correlation between GNP and the aforementioned alternative proxies of technology is generally quite high, at over 0.75.”[14] And the measurement of resources (R) is determined using the proxy of territorial area. In order to properly apply lateral pressure theory to a conflict situation the recommended proxies used to measure the different variables must be provided. In part three of this study the proxies for measurement will be slightly modified in order to reduce the limitations of the proxies used for measurement and procure greater explanatory power of the Ecuador-Peru conflict of 1995.

             Another limitation of the theory, as recognized by Choucri and North, asserts that the non-material interests of states also shape the interaction of any dyad. Unlike the rationalist International Relations theories of Realism, which ‘black-box’ states as analogous rational unitary actors seeking only their own survival (extracting from microeconomic theory),[15] lateral pressure theory recognizes that the way in which states interact depends on the particular dyadic relationship of the states involved, non-material interests being an important factor. And so, lateral pressure theory does not postulate that the uneven growth and development of the three master variables within a state is always the cause of interstate violence. Instead, it explicitly states that it,

“…has the potential to magnify or activate conflict, and posits a set of intervening variables and a wider array of proximate stimuli…Potentially conflict-prone intersections of interest abroad between states which are expanding their activities beyond their borders, for instance, are most likely to turn violent when relations between these states are already hostile…”[16]

In other words, states with relatively good relationships will not often seek needed P, R, or T from within one another’s borders through military force. It is more often dyads with relatively unfavorable relationships that will seek to obtain one or more of the three master variables from within the others territory using military force.[17] For lateral pressure theorists, the three master variables are excellent material indicators for understanding and predicting conflict. However, recognizing the uniqueness of any given dyad and individual state profile is very important as well.

            In succinct, lateral pressure theory postulates that under certain conditions conflict in the modern state system is rooted in the uneven growth or development of three master variables, that these variables are highly interactive, and as a state has increased growth and development of one of the variables there is pressure to increase the growth and development of the other variables. There are limitations to the material proxies used to measure the three master variables, and there are non-material interests that can affect dyadic relationships as well. Nonetheless, with its recognition of the importance of material and non-material variables influencing state behaviour, lateral pressure theory can procure improved explanatory power of conflict situations if effective proxies are used to measure the three master variables and state profiles and dyadic relationships can be properly identified.

 

Part Three

Lateral Pressure and the Ecuador-Peru Dyad

            Now that the task of giving a condensed account of the conflict situation, and providing an overview of the basic tenets and operational tools used in applying lateral pressure theory to conflict situations has been completed, the task of using lateral pressure theory to better understand the outbreak of the Ecuador-Peru border conflict of 1995 will be attempted. This part of the study will begin with an explanation of the proxies used to measure the dyad and explain the modifications made to the proxies for this dyad analysis. A chart that explicitly reveals the empirical data for the proxies of measurement will follow.

            P is measured using the percentage of average annual population growth from 1985-1994, January 1995 being the time of the outbreak of conflict. The R factor will be measured by using change in population density from 1985-1995. Using population density as the indicator of R, as opposed to territorial area alone, is a modification of the proxy used to measure the R variable that provides a better tool of analysis for comparison of growth over time.[18] As population density increases resources per capita decreases, and so, the table shows negative figures for the R variable over the 1985-1995 time period as both states increased in population and remained constant in territorial area. The percentage of average annual growth in GNP (GNP being the recommended proxy for measurement of the T or technology variable), from 1985-1994 is used to determine T.

Figure 2

	(P) (%) +/- Avg. annual Population (1985-1994)	(R) (%) +/- Net resources per capita (1985-1995)	(T) (%) +/-Avg. annual GNP (1985-1994)
Ecuador	+2.3	-31.2	+3.3
Peru	+2.0	-22.1	-0.5

[19]

The percentage change of average annual population was relatively similar between Ecuador and Peru. However, as Ecuador is much smaller in territorial area (the recommended proxy used to measure resources or R), Ecuador suffered over a 9% loss in R relative to Peru, which was less than half as densely populated as Ecuador in 1995.[20] The chart reveals that Ecuador far surpassed Peru in technological growth or T, with Peru showing a 0.5% decreases in T annually over the time period from 1985-1994. Ecuador’s growth in T amounted to over 30%, a large change in comparison to Peru at only around a 5%, a change for Peru that was also a decline. With Ecuador making substantial increases in T, at around 35% relative to Peru, the difference in the T variable that took place from 1985-1995 between the states is significant. The T variable is the most significant relative change in the dyad, followed by R, and then P.

            Lateral pressure theory explains that significant increases in technology and real need for additional resources can activate conflict under certain conditions. As stated by Nazli Choucri, “The historical record seems to suggest that states which (due to rapidly advancing technology, and thus comparatively high levels of capabilities and a real and perceived need for additional resources) generate the highest levels of lateral pressure and fight more wars per country than other states.”[21] The evidence reveals that Ecuador made substantial technological, or T increases, especially in comparison to its lagging neighbor who was much more rich in resources, or R. Lateral pressure theory explains that the R variable was the variable most needed by Ecuador (the aggressor in the conflict), to sustain and balance the rapid growth of T and P. And since R could not be increased within Ecuador, Ecuador sought the recently proclaimed oil rich territory, which was historically disputed over, or R, in Peru to balance the rapid relative growth of T and P.            As explained in Part Two of this study, properly identifying the relationship of the states in a dyad, as well as the individual state profiles, is an important aspect of analysis when using lateral pressure theory. As explained earlier, states with relatively good relationships will not often seek needed P, R, or T from within one another’s borders through military force. It is more often dyads with relatively unfavorable relationships that will seek one or more of the three master variables from within the other’s territory using military force. In this particular case study, the relationship of the states in the dyad was not favorable. This is not a difficult conclusion to draw, as the two states were at odds over this particular border territory since 1802. Ecuador’s need for R, and Peru’s discovery of oil in the historically disputed territory were activators of the conflict but not the only activators. According to lateral pressure theory, the need for R by Ecuador and the historically unfavorable relationship of the states, particularly in regards to the Cenepa region, caused the outbreak of conflict.

            Lateral pressure theory procures an improved theoretical understanding of the outbreak Ecuador-Peru border conflict of 1995 because it adequately measures material variables while still placing importance on the relationship of the states in the dyad and state profiles, or non-material variables. As lateral pressure theory explains, uneven growth and development of the three master variables can activate conflict, but conflict is much more likely where the dyadic intersections of interests are between states with unfavourable relationships. The outbreak of the Ecuador-Peru border conflict of 1995 is a situation where the lateral pressure theory explanation of outbreak of conflict is applicable for both material (uneven growth of the three mater variables) and non-material reasons (the unfavourable dyad relationship).

Conclusion

            While lateral pressure theory may provide an improved theoretical understanding of the outbreak Ecuador-Peru border conflict of 1995, the theory has limitations, especially in regards to how the three master variables are measured. These limitations can be overcome by modifying the proxies used to measure the three master variables. As each dyad is unique, the proxies can be modified according to specificities in order to procure greater explanatory power. For example, in this study resources (R) may have been better measured by examining a specific resource such as oil instead of territory or territory per capita.

            Though not so problematic in this particular study, there are also limitations in evaluating non-material variables. This is in regards to the assessment of state profiles and dyad relationships. Properly identifying non-material variables may require a considerable amount of time consuming archival or historical research and current event assessment. This poses as less of a problem for the post de facto analysis of conflict that is conducted in this study than for conflict that has not yet occurred. Though assessing non-material factors may pose as an obstacle to predicating conflict using lateral pressure theory, assessing the non-material factors is not an obstacle that cannot be overcome.

            Lateral pressure theory procures an improved theoretical understanding of the outbreak of conflict because it adequately measures material variables while still placing importance on the relationship of the states and state profiles. Not only does the theory provide a framework of analysis for measuring material variables that may activate conflict, it recognizes the non-material variables that may also lead to conflict. Though using lateral pressure theory to analyze and predict conflict may be a tedious process, its very tediousness provides greater predicative proficiency than other theories that take a less integrated approach to analyzing the causal variables that activate and lead to conflict situations.

 

 

 

 

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Works Cited

“Encyclopaedia Britannica: 1985 Book of the Year,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. USA (1985).

“Encyclopaedia Britannica: 1995 Book of the Year,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. USA (1995).

Paul Collier et at., “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy,” World Bank, (2003), (pp. 1-91).

Nazli Choucri; R. C. North, “Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence,” W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, CA (1989).

Nazli Choucri; Anne-Katrin Wickboldt, “Profiles of States as Fuzzy Sets: Methodological Refinement of Lateral Pressure Theory,” MIT Department of Political Science, Cambridge, MA (2006) (pp. 1-33).

Scott Gates; Torbjørn L. Knutsen; Jonathon W. Moses, “Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View,”

           Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Feb. 1996), (pp. 1-10).

Robert C. North, “War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis,”

               Westview Press, Boulder, CO (1990).

David Scott Palmer, “Peru-Ecuador border conflict: Missed opportunities, misplaced nationalism, and multilateral peacekeeping,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 39 (Fall 1997), (3), (pp. 109-148).

Beth A. Simmons, “Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru.” United States Institute of Peace: Peaceworks, no. 27 (April 1999): (pp. 1-52), (Accessed via internet <http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks27.pdf>)..

“UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset v.4-2007, 1946 – 2006,” Excel spreadsheet, (Accessed via internet <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm>.

Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” Addison Wesley, New York, NY (1979).