I. INTRODUCTION

The US Department of State and the EU currently hold the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), a guerrilla insurgent group operating in and controlling territory throughout Colombia, a terrorist organization.[1] Opposition to ELN within Colombia includes the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Colombian government, and now to a lesser extent, the paramilitaries. [2] Though the larger, and more infamous FARC may pose as a greater security issue to Colombia and surrounding states, the significance of the ELN should not go without recognition.

 

This paper will begin with a brief historical record of the ELN and explain its ideological roots. Following this, it will provide a theoretical assessment and comparison with the FARC. An explanation of past and current ELN armed activities follows this. After engaging in these dynamics the focus will be placed more directly on describing past and current negotiation processes. The expectation is that the information provided in this paper will serve as a platform of understanding upon which negotiations with the ELN can be better established. The last section will make policy suggestions regarding the current peace process and describe how its outcomes could be beneficial in helping to move along the peace process at large in Colombia

 

II. UNDERSTANDING THE ELN

Following the fall of Havana in 1959 to the revolutionaries in Cuba, leftist movements began to emerge throughout Latin America.[3] The success of the young leftist Cubans, and the influence of a newly developing theology of liberation, or liberation theology, which fused Marxist ideals and Catholicism, inspired the formation of the ELN.[4] The ELN formally emerged in 1964 as a movement of radical Catholics, leftist University students, and labour activists.[5]

 

Like many Latin American countries, Colombia had been marked by a history of poverty and violence.[6] Widespread poverty was largely owing to the continual violence. It has been said by one author that armed conflict is ‘a fact of life’ in Colombia.[7] During the 1950’s and early 1960’s liberation theological thought became increasingly influential in Latin America.[8] This theology emphasizes the significance and relevance of certain elements of Christianity in impoverished Latin America melded with Marxist nuances.[9] As the Latin American population is both poor and believing, Moylan suggests that the ability of liberation theology to reconcile both faith and Marxism is precisely why its message has been so potent in that area’s social movements.[10] Liberation theology, with its Marxist undertones, gave the Colombians a “messianic interruption of the continuum of history effectively carried out through a religious discourse allied with the larger, secular project of human emancipation.”[11]

 

Though there has been scepticism regarding the pervasiveness of liberation theology in Latin American movements of the day,[12] the ELN continues to draw upon its rhetoric. They have been doing this for more than forty years. The liberation message is inherent to the inception of the ELN. Furthermore, from 1973 until his death on 6 April 1998, a former priest, Father Manuel Pérez, was the ELN’s leader.[13] The Central Command of the ELN has masterfully propagated a liberation message. As late as 29 February 2008 the ELN used rhetoric that echoes liberation theology in an online article.

 

This particular article calls upon the heroic deeds of the ‘prophet’ and ‘martyr’ leaders Father Domingo Laín (native of Spain) and Father Camillo Torres (native of Colombia).[14] Both ELN leaders were armed combatants and were previously rural parish pastors. In this article Torres is quoted, “la revolución no sólo es permitida sino obligatoria para los Cristianos,”[15] which means, “the revolution is not only allowed but obligatory for the Christians.” The objectives claimed by the ELN are the objectives of liberation theology: the liberation of the poor masses of Colombian society.

 

The ideology of the ELN, which has been greatly influenced by liberation theology, seems to have candidly shaped the movement’s objectives. The attainment of the movement’s objectives has been manifested as an armed resistance to a government and socio-economic structure that they perceive as illegitimate and oppressive.[16]

 

III. CONFLICT ENTREPRENEURS?

Although the ELN may seem ‘at face value’ to be a group of true believers in the cause that they claim to represent, work by Paul Collier indicates that this may not be the reality. He suggests that rebel movements voice ideological objectives to avoid being viewed simply as criminals, or just greedy,[17] which may very well be true of the ELN. He suggests “grievance will turn out to be neither a cause of conflict, nor an accidental by-product of it. Rather, a sense of grievance is deliberately generated by rebel organizations.” He continues, “where rebellions happen to be financially viable, wars will occur”, furthermore, “As part of the process of war, the rebel organization must generate group grievance for military effectiveness. The generation of group grievance politicizes the war. Thus, the war produces the intense political conflict, not the intense political conflict the war.”[18] For Collier and others, rebels, like all people, are rational economic actors. Moreover, according to Collier the ELN would be ‘conflict entrepreneurs’.

 

Though there is reason to be sceptical about their actual ‘grievances’, the ELN has shown itself to be much more ideologically laden[19] than the FARC and more dependent on the sentiments of the Colombian people.[20] Intelligence reports often group the ELN and the FARC together as drug-trafficking, extortive movements motivated by greed and power gains.[21] Though this is definitely truer of the FARC,[22] the ELN leaders have repeatedly attempted to separate their movement from the illicit drug-trade that is so infamous in Colombia.[23] Furthermore, its formal categorical rejection of involvement with the coca crop in 1999 was based on “economic, political, social and moral arguments.”[24]

 

Nonetheless, the ELN has participated in a multitude of shoddy activities to fund its operations. They are primarily known for kidnapping and the destruction of infrastructure. They have heavily targeted pipelines of both national and multinational oil companies.[25] Moreover, despite the Central Command’s formal rejection of involvement in the illicit drug trade, undeniable evidence points to the involvement of ELN members in drug trafficking, protection of cultivators, etc.[26]

 

Though clearly less involved than the FARC[27] and new paramilitary groups in the notorious and lucrative business, the ELN cannot separate itself from coca completely. This is probably due to the inability of the Central Command to directly monitor the activities of all its mobilized groups throughout the country.[28]

 

An 11 October 2007 International Crisis Group (ICG) Report indicates that annual drug revenues for the ELN were around one million US dollars.[29] ICG and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) both indicate that drug trafficking has replaced kidnapping and other extortive activities as the main source of income for the ELN. However, one million US dollars is hardly enough money to support the ELN which consists of approximately 2,220-3,000 rebels.[30] The FARC, according to CFR, takes in between $200-$300 million annually from the drug trade.[31] A recent ICG report indicates that FARC coca related annual income is probably between $500-$600 million.[32] Though they have 3-4 times the members of the ELN, either figure tells us that the FARC is much more dependent the coca for income than the ELN. Further investigation should to be done before conclusive statements about ELN sources of income are made.

 

As stated previously, both the FARC and the ELN were largely products of a successful 1959 Leftist Cuban revolution. The ELN has ideologically identified with the liberation theology movement while the FARC claims to be strictly Marxist-Leninist. Regardless of ideological claims however, as pointed out by Collier, combatant motives are often falsely asserted at their inception and will evolve over time as war economies develop.[33] There is reason to believe that the motives of these insurgent movements may have moved far beyond the ideologies so seemingly salient at their dawning.

 

Some reports have indicated that the appeals to ideology have been primarily a means of attracting idealistic young people. It has been suggested that these appeals to ideology are withering in their effectiveness with the end of the Cold War. The current reality in Colombia helps to substantiate Collier’s assumptions about war economies and actual rebel motivations. The FARC, which has greater promise for personal economic gains via its extensive involvement in the drug trade, has been much more attractive to recruits than the ELN.[34]

 

Quite different than their Marxist ideological claims, the FARC guerrillas are widely known to have lost their ideological motivations by and large.[35]  Their main focus is likely the coca trade.

 

Clearly, the ELN has been entangled in the drug trade and involved heavily in extortive activities. Even with that said, it still continues to rely much more on its ideology in gaining recruits and maintaining the sentiments of the people than the FARC. Furthermore, the ELN’s attempt to separate itself from the drug trade has hurt them, as it is a lucrative business. This may be telling of the significance of ideology for the movement, as it has been willing to give up some of the economic benefits that come by involvement with the coca crop to take a moral stance. Adding to this, ELN involvement in coca may decline substantially as one of its leaders, ‘Pablito’, was captured in early January. He caused internal strife for the group and Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos said of ‘Pablito’ that, “He was the ELN leader most hostile to any kind of dialogue with the government. He wanted to strengthen the military wing using proceeds from drug trafficking.”[36]

To conclude this section, the ELN has been far less successful than the FARC in gaining new recruits, probably owing to the fact that less personal economic gain exists with the ELN. However, possibly owing to the way in which ideological commitments have been manifested by the ELN, they have been more successful in obtaining at least implicit support from the Colombian people.[37] Speculatively, they attract a different type of recruit than the FARC, probably one that is a more ‘true believer’ in the cause.

 

This point is not made in order to glorify the ELN as a sort of  ‘Robin Hood’ movement in Colombia. Instead, the point is made to show that the ELN may be quite different than the way it is often portrayed by policymakers and others. Furthermore, although they are often placed into the same category as the larger and more infamous FARC, a deeper look reveals that there are clear distinctions between the two. Moreover, and more importantly for practical purposes, these are distinctions that must be taken into account by those at the negotiating table.

 

IV. PROTRACTED WARFARE

There was only a short break from conflict following La Violencia (1948-1958),[38] Shortly thereafter in 1964 the ELN and FARC insurgent movements formally emerged. Their influence has been broad reaching, and they are now considered by some scholars to be ‘para-statal organizations’.[39]

 

The first ELN guerrilla[40] operation was launched on 7 January 1965. This led to the temporary control of a small town called Simacota. During the 1960s and 70s ELN activities involved the temporary capture of small towns where they would rob banks, free prisoners, and commit a host of other malign activities that caused problems for the Colombian government. In addition to these measures, the ELN was widely diffusing revolutionary propaganda in the attempt to mobilize civil society towards revolution.[41]

 

Originally the military strategy of the ELN was influenced by Che Guevara’s foquismo doctrine, which was based on his idea that revolutionary sentiments would come from the peasant masses. This would eventually lead to an overthrow of the government by way of their support. [42] Clearly, in comparison to the Cuban guerrillas, the ELN was not so successful in doing this. Nonetheless, it sill reported that “Rather than relying on armed threats to control communities, ELN militants have been active as local political entrepreneurs.”[43]

 

In the 1980s ELN operations shifted more towards urban centres. Reportedly, this was due to a decline in its ‘social base’ in the more rural areas that the movement had been accustomed to.[44] This may also have been due to an overall expansion following their first National Conference in 1983, entitled the “National Reunion of Heroes and Martyrs in Anorí”, which dispersed the ELN out into smaller groups throughout Colombia.

 

At their third National Conference in 1996 the ELN would ‘return to its roots’ with a renewed embrace of the foquismo doctrine. This return to the foquismo doctrine was characterized by an attempt to reassert political power at local and municipal levels.[45]

 

In the more industrial department of Aracua, where the ELN continues to maintain control, patronage systems were set up in the 1980s and early 1990s. With dominant authority in the area, the ELN was able to make armed threats against local economic and political elites from whom they extorted vast sums of money from oil royalties. The same was true in other areas throughout the northern departments of Colombia. By 1995 more than fifty percent of the ELN’s activities were directed towards destroying infrastructure.

 

Controlling areas where extortive relationships can be maintained has occupied much of the ELN activity for quite some time.[46] However, interactions with the FARC, Colombian military, and the AUC, have been extremely violent and continue to threaten ELN dominance in other departments.

 

Adding to this, 1991 marked the breakdown of The Simon de Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination. It was founded in 1989 following the ELN’s Second National Conference and was an attempt to unite the guerrilla opposition movements. It included Colombia’s larger guerrilla groups at the time but was never effective. The various groups continued to fight one another for dominance in various regions, particularly in the Norte de Satander and Arauaca departments. In fact, the co-op dwindled away particularly because of intensified violence between the ELN and the FARC.

 

In addition to the violence, there was an overall lack of interest on part of the FARC.[47] One could surmise that the FARC was more concerned with it coca connections than with forming revolutionary alliances. For the Colombian government, the dissolution of the Simon de Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination was probably a good thing, as it was the broadest guerrilla coalition formed since the 1960s. A united guerrilla force, particularly a united FARC and ELN, may have posed an even more serious threat to government control of the country.

 

Amid continued contention, in some areas it is believed that the two groups are now fighting together. The Center for International Policy’s Colombia Program has indicated that this is one of the greatest fears of the Colombian government as exploratory peace talks are underway with the ELN in Havana.[48]

 

Despite the ELN’s ongoing clashes with the FARC and the Colombian military, in the late 1990s the AUC paramilitaries became the greatest threat to ELN controlled areas (as they were often funded by the elites from whom the ELN were extorting royalties).[49] As noted earlier, the power of the AUC has since declined and the current Colombian President Alvaro Uribe declared in 2005 that the AUC has been disbanded and disarmed, leaving only ELN and FARC to be dealt with. [50]

 

The AUC has been officially demobilized but prior to doing so they managed to deal a serious blow to ELN strength. It is worth noting that it is widely believed AUC attacks on the ELN were, “generally in coordination with the police and military.”[51] To this day a series of violent disputes have erupted between various smaller competing factions and the ELN. Many of these smaller groups have emerged from the remnants of AUC members who did not disarm or were ineffectively reintegrated into society.[52] Some speculate that the government and military still support some of these groups and that several have infiltrated high governmental offices.[53] 

 

Indeed, the ELN declined militarily since the early 1990s and the levels of military actions have declined steadily as well. They have fallen gradually from 195 per year in 2002 to 19 in 2007.[54] Reports indicating the number of ELN combatants have been varied. Though this statement has not been confirmed, in an April correspondence with an ICG analyst at the Bogotá field office, it was indicated that the ELN might be closer to 1200-1500 fighters with several hundred unarmed members contributing to logistics, etc.[55] In 2002 one policy report indicated that there was as many as 8,000,[56] while another in the same year put the number at 3,500 to 5,000.[57] An October 2007 ICG estimate put the group at a weakened 2,200-3,000. The same report indicates that the ELN lost 1,900 to desertion and 2,100 to capture between 2002 and 2007 while also noting that there are some analysts who speculate the ELN is purposely declining in military strength in order to pursue a more non-violent political strategy.[58]

 

V. TOWARDS A PEACE PROCESS

Speculations seem to be holding up in light of recent ELN rhetoric indicating “It is part of our contribution that there is an honest dialogue and a responsible search to find a political solution to the conflict.”[59] Boudon predicted in 1996 that if the state increased its ability to provide security (which it has), and uphold rule of law (questionable)[60], then the Colombians would become “less willing to place their faith in the guerrillas and their para-statal organizations,” leading to an eventual necessity for the ELN, which is dependent on the sentiments of the people, to pursue political strategies for resolving the conflict and obtaining their objectives.

 

Boudon indicates that political strategies would be necessary in order for the group to avoid extinction.[61] Although it has been indicated by a number of organizations, including the United Nations, that there has been a host of recent human rights violations at the cost of increased security, many of the Colombian people may just be weary of the continued violence and hence more likely to discontinue support for the guerrillas. If Boudon and others are correct, a non-violent political settlement will be the only viable option for the ELN.

 

The ELN has indicated in the past that they seek to achieve political solutions to the conflict and negotiations have failed. Maybe the ELN is now pursuing an increased political agenda to achieve a more legitimate political status, or maybe they are all out of other options, a political option being their only real chance for survival.

 

Possibly, it is combination of both wanting to be considered a legitimate political group and also a fear of being completely dissolved. But while they are declining militarily, it has been indicated that the ELN “is probably both militarily stronger than the government believes and politically weaker than its leaders think.”[62] Either way, Colombia remains in an evermore-confusing disarray of violence. As it has been in the past, the average Colombian people suffer most as close to a dozen lose their lives everyday and hundreds more are internally displaced.[63]

 

VI. AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

President Álvaro Uribe was elected in 2002 and then re-elected in 2006. Based on his pre-election promises and increased aid from the US, the impression of the Colombian people is that Uribe should deliver greater results in regards to the conflict than his predecessor Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). Uribe is known for his staunch position toward the insurgent groups. In spite of his stern dispositions, he has suggested negotiating with the rebels. Moreover, he champions his success in demobilizing the AUC of around 23,000 members.[64] Particularly in light of his successes with the AUC demobilization,[65] and also the inability of previous administrations in achieving a military solution to eradicate armed groups, President Uribe may see negotiations as the only viable option for achieving peace during his eight years in office.

 

Though there had been previous negotiations with the FARC and others in the early eighties, the Barco administration (1986-1990) set the precedent for negotiating with the ELN. President César Gavaria (1990-1994) also entered into talks with the ELN. Each of these rounds of talks was of no avail. Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), the predecessor of Pastrana, announced that he would attempt to re-establish peace talks that had failed and were postponed indefinitely in October of 1992 under President Gavaria. Samper’s formal announcement for dialogue, which took place on 17 November 1994, was welcomed by both the FARC and the ELN.[66] Though the FARC was not explicit, the ELN was very clear about its objectives going into the negotiation process. These included “a reduction in military spending, the elimination of military impunity, and the replacement of neoliberal economic policy with a model of industrial stimulation.”[67] Current ELN demands are not much different. Ideology and claims seem to have remained relatively consistent throughout the course of the ELN’s history.[68]

 

The Samper negotiations were also unsuccessful in obtaining a serious peace initiative, however around 740 ELN combatants demobilized in 1994. Many of these former rebels formed a think tank in the mid-nineties that is now actively following and even involved in the peace process.[69]

 

Like the ELN, the FARC has been in sporadic negotiations with the government. These have also been unsuccessful. More notably, when the FARC was given regional autonomy by Pastrana in exchange for an agreement to come to the peace table, the FARC failed to even show up.

Despite shortcomings with the FARC and the ELN, and in addition to the more recent AUC negotiations, the track record for negotiations with rebel groups in Colombia has not been entirely unsuccessful. By the time that the ELN had entered into its first peace talks, several armed groups had already signed peace deals and were being integrated into the political process. Some even received small shares of votes in the 1990 elections.[70]

 

With the success of the negotiations with the smaller rebel groups, President Gavaria was optimistic about political solutions with the FARC and ELN. As indicated earlier, these negotiations were futile. Some have assessed that this was probably owing to the lagging willingness on either side to make necessary concessions and the lack of initiative in carrying out an effective ceasefire during the negotiation process. The debates over ceasefire agreements, no-fire zones, and other negotiation preconditions have inhibited talks from ever really getting under way.[71] In many ways, the failure for either side to make realistic concessions has been the central reason why each round of negotiations have failed in the past.

Moving ahead to the current peace talks with the ELN, it has been close to three years that the Uribe government has been in dialogue, or “exploratory talks”, with the rebels in Havana under High Peace Commissioner of Colombia Luis Carlos Restrepo. One analyst has recently indicated that the talks are “in big trouble.”[72]

 

For some time Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was the appointed facilitator of talks between the ELN and Colombian officials. He was ‘fired’ by Uribe in November, and since then there has been no reported contact between the ELN and the Colombian government. On 11 January Chávez made a proposition before the Venezuelan National Assembly to grant formal political status to the ELN and the FARC. The ELN Central Command hailed the move and strategists on the ground have indicated that the ELN has formed an abiding alliance with the Chávez government. The scepticism of some is that the ELN will not re-enter into dialogue with the Uribe government until Chávez is reappointed to his position of facilitator.[73] The recent visit to Caracas of Bill Richardson, the governor of the US state of New Mexico, to speak with Chávez on the hostage crisis with the FARC should be seen as a positive sign for Chávez re-entering into a liaison position for the ELN situation as well.[74]

 

Though many analysts are quite pessimistic, the peace process is not hopeless. However, negotiating with the ELN poses much greater challenges than with groups that have been demobilized. Previously demobilized rebel groups were willing to accept concessions that would give them certain amounts of amnesty and the right to take part in the political process.[75] The ELN has a much greater demand. They want the Colombian government to guarantee serious and binding socioeconomic reforms before demobilizing and have assured that peace talks will be lengthy as a result of this.

 

The FARC makes similar claims and has been equally difficult to demobilize. However, it has been indicated that they are probably more concerned with not demobilizing as a result of their multi-million dollar drug profits. As a result of their larger size and deeply imbedded involvement with cocaine, the FARC poses as a much greater threat to security than the ELN. It is likely that the coca problem must be first solved before any serious hopes of FARC demobilization will come to being.

 

Although talks are in hiatus, it is a relatively short stalemate when looking at the history of peace talks. The timing may be right for a peaceful political solution with the ELN. This is said in light of various points of analysis made in this paper. Though the FARC is much larger, and a much greater security threat, the demobilization of the ELN could be seen as a short-term accomplishment in the long-term attempt to end the conflict in Colombia.

 

VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PEACE

Based on the information provided, findings indicate that a negotiated peace with the ELN is a viable option. Before shifting to policy suggestions, some contextual points are restated below.

·  The ELN has shown itself to be quite ideologically motivated

·  Probably militarily stronger than the Colombian government thinks; yet politically weaker than they think

·  For over twenty years both sides have been willing to enter peace talks

·  A political solution may be the ELN’s only viable option for survival and Uribe’s only option for peace

 

Below are some demands and proposals in regards to the negotiation process that the ELN remains insistent about.[76]

 

Prerequisites

1)           Under the auspices of a broad international community that includes governmental leaders, representatives of NGOs, and Church leaders;[77]

2)           The negotiations shall be trilateral, including: i. insurgents; ii. the State; iii. civil society;[78]

3)           No ceasefire agreement during negotiations, no concentration of insurgents;

4)           All parties to comply with international laws pertaining to jus in bello and human rights;

5)           Equal rights for all parties during the peace process.

 

Negotiation Proposals

1)           Addressing the structural causes of the conflict: widespread poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and government corruption;

2)           All parties to submit themselves to an investigation by the International Fact-finding Commission;

3)           The dismantling of the State army and the creation of a new one with guerrillas in leadership roles and ranks;

4)           Decreased economic dependency on the United States;

5)           Nationalization of resources, esp. oil.

 

Not surprisingly, the ELN’s demands are quite ambitious. In reference to negotiation prerequisites, the ELN will have to make concessions regarding a ceasefire that also includes the removal of antipersonnel mines. It seems plausible that the ELN will agree to this after certain benchmarks have been met, a more notable benchmark being the onset of an investigation by the International Fact-finding Commission.

 

Uribe has indicated since he took office that he will not enter into a ceasefire that does not include an end to kidnappings and a release of hostages. This is a concession that could be made. However, if the ELN is to release hostages and cease militant activities it will be necessary for the State to provide the militants with the means for survival. This option has been proposed in the past. The most appropriate means would be the providing of food, medical supplies, etc. Only the necessary items needed for survival should be provided to the militants during the ceasefire. Very little direct monetary support need be provided. Neutral third parties, possibly NGOs working in the areas where the militants are located should make the delivery of these items while keeping the locations of guerrillas undisclosed to the State.

 

As far as a concentration of ELN fighters in a particular area, this will not likely occur until a final settlement has come about. ELN leaders have indicated that this could be military suicide should a peaceful political solution fail.

 

Moving to negotiation proposals, addressing the structural causes of the conflict will prove to be a lengthy process. A concession could be made on each side however. The compromise could work as such: the State increases its funding for social issues and proves to be proactive for a long enough period of time that it seems the policies will continue even after a settlement has been reached and the ELN puts down its arms. Once this trajectory looks to be intractable, the ELN could demobilize a large number of combatants who would be allowed the opportunity to partake in peaceful social projects and work as liaisons between the State and the FARC. These may seem to be unrealistic suggestions; however, as indicated previously, former ELN combatants take part in the current peace process and current combatants participate in social projects. This type of work is not unfamiliar to the ELN. Integrating former ELN members into social projects and liaison positions will pose a quite modest challenge in comparison to integrating them into the military.

 

As in other areas, both sides must make concessions regarding the ELN’s military participation. The ELN will have to prove some degree of loyalty to the existing governmental apparatus. They must look not to overthrow the existing structure but instead strive to reform it from within while respecting the rule of law and existing democratic institutions. Proof of a commitment to doing so could be shown during engagement in peaceful social projects. After a certain period of time doing so, the combatants could be permitted to join the State military.[79] During this time the military should still be operating under the auspices of the International Fact-finding Commission, or other third-party monitor, in order to prevent marginalization of any group or individual within military ranks.

 

For decades the US has been seen by the ELN as ‘the bad guy’ operating in conjunction with the exploitive government in Colombia. This perception has to be changed. In order for this to occur, the US must first remove the ELN from the FTO list as this inhibits the US government from entering into dialogue with the group and gives a ‘bad impression’.

 

The ELN could potentially be a great ally to the US and the Colombian State in their attempt to implement agrarian policies that promote the cultivation of licit crops. The ELN has ties to agrarian communities and demobilized ELN members could aide in the implementation of these policies under the support of the US and the Colombian State.

 

A nationalization of natural resources and decreased dependency on the US will not likely occur. Concessions can be made in these areas however. Firstly, the State should substantially increase taxes on extracted goods and proceeds of the taxes should go directly towards social services. As far as decreased dependence on the US, agrarian policies and social reforms from within should naturally reduce US dependency over time. This is not to say that trade will decrease between the states and their respective businesses, instead, the relationship will become one that is less exploitive and more mutually beneficial.

 

Eight policy recommendations are outlined below:

1)     Removal of ELN from the FTO list; incorporate the US in the negotiation process and reconstruction;

2)     Civil society, NGO involvement in negotiation process, Catholic Church to facilitate mediation;

3)     A release of hostages and removal of antipersonnel mines by the ELN after certain benchmarks are made;

4)     Give ELN leadership the opportunity to take part in democratic process;

5)     Admittance of human rights violations on both sides; amnesty to most Colombian government representatives and rebels; trials to be held for those committing grave atrocities on each side;

6)     Place proven loyal former ELN leaders in liaison positions between the FARC and Government, reintegration to also include the opportunity to join the State military;

7)     Colombian government to increase taxes on extracted goods; proceeds to go towards social programs.

8)     Participation by the ELN in agrarian reforms.

 

VIII. CONCLUSION

Important aspects of the situation have been provided and insightful directions for policy have been suggested. While the ELN is much smaller and poses as much less of a threat to security than the FARC, the demobilisation of the ELN is quite important. It is a short-term step towards a more comprehensive peace process in Colombia. It is a step that, if successful, can decisively contribute to the peace process at large in that country.

 

In order for the situation to be positive, a better understanding of the parties involved and an improved insight of what is happening on the ground must be achieved. This should lead to the making of necessary concessions by all parties involved in the peace process. The most positive aspect of the situation is that all parties are increasingly looking towards political solutions to the conflict.

 

The situation in Colombia has real implications for what happens throughout the Americas and the globe. Colombia has increasingly been in the news recently with the proposed Colombian free-trade agreement with the US and the current hostage situation involving Ingrid Betancourt. Adding this, there are recent reports linking that the Colombian coca trade more closely to Venezuela and increasing amounts of Colombian cocaine making its way to Europe.

 

All actors must move quickly towards the negotiating table at this time when a political situation seems highly viable. The situation could rapidly change as daily there are new developments and setbacks.

 

Works Cited

Ana M. Arjona; Stathis Kalyvas, “Preliminary Results of a Survey of Demobilized Combatants in Colombia”, Forthcoming Paper, Yale University, 11 May 2006, (pp. 1-51).

Lawrence Boudon, “Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process”, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, May 1996 (pp. 279-297).

Virginia M. Bouvier, “Colombia: Building Peace in a time of War”, United States Institute Peace of Press, 2006, (pp. 1-34).

Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy”, Department of Economics, Oxford University, April 2006 (pp. 1-26).

“Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?”, ICG Latin America Briefing No. 16, Bogotá/Brussels, 11 October 2007 (pp.1-19).

“Colombia: The Prospects for Peace with the ELN”, ICG Latin America Report No. 2, Bogotá/Brussels, 4 October 2002 (pp.1-42).

“Colombia’s New Armed Groups”, ICG Latin American Report N. 20, Bogotá/Brussels, 10 May 2007, (pp. 1-33).

“ELN Statement of Revolutionary Goals”, The Center for International Policy’s Colombia Project, 22 June 2001, available at (http://ciponline.org/colombia/elngoals.htm), accessed on 9 March 2008

Manzar Foroohar, “Liberation Theology: The Response of Latin American Catholics to Socioeconomic Problems”, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 3, Religion, Resistance, Revolution, Summer, 1986 (pp. 37-58).

Ernesto “Che” Guevara, “Guerrilla Warfare”, Trans. and published by: BN Publishing, USA, 2007, (pp. 5-105).

Stephanie Hanson, “FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left-Wing Guerrillas”, Council on Foreign Relations, 11 March 2008, available at (http://www.cfr.org/publication/9272/), accessed on 13 March 2008.

Phillip McLean, “Colombia-Thinking Clearly about the Conflict”, Center For Strategic and International Studies, Policy Papers on the Americas, Vol. 13, Study 7, October 2002 (pp. 1-12).

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