14 May 2008
The
hot topic this week regarding Colombia is the extradition of 14 former
paramilitary leaders to the US to stand trial for atrocious war crimes and
involvement in the drug-trade. This seems to me like the subject of extradition
to the US has not been so paramount since the ‘Extraditable’ era of the late
eighties and early nineties in which big hitters in the coca trade like Pablo
Escobar & co. launched an offensive against the State in order to avoid
being captured and also to obtain the release of leadership captives.
What’s
different now than that era is that there is not a cohesive leadership (like
the one that Escobar had) among the active and former paramilitaries that is
capable of bartering. Being that the captives have very little incentive to not
‘sing like canaries’-revealing the ‘ins and outs’ of their doings-which should
include the giving away of names of others who were involved in the crimes that
they are being tried for. While this is a good thing, it also creates a new
problem.
With
almost ‘nothing to lose’, surely the extradited leaders will give both true and
false information. In all likelihood they will throw many of those who are
guilty (especially their adversaries) ‘under the bus’. Indeed, they will also
make false allegations against some of their adversaries that may be innocent.
It is my persuasion that many of the guilty will get away scot-free while many
of the guilty will also be brought to justice. On the flipside, many innocent
people (or relatively innocent people) will be falsely indicted and serve time.
Let us look forward to a classic witch-hunt in these trials.
I
am not sure how secretive the trials will be carried out, if at all (I would
encourage anyone to shed light on that for me). Surely, keeping the trials out
of the public eye’s view will make for a much less convoluted process-and
subsequent outcome. Hopefully these trials will serve as a deterrent and be a
victory for rule of law in general. Success is contingent on delicate factors
however, (I think) mostly in regards to the way that the trials are conducted.
Colombia
is in a much different time period now than the ‘Extraditable’ era of Escobar
& company. This is probably the most positive aspect of this round of
extraditions as the paramilitaries and their remnants have substantially less
bargaining power at this point.
Overall
I am optimistic, though I could be interpreted as the contrary. I am certainly
no expert but I think we will all just have to wait and see how things turn
out. The events that transpire from these trials will surely impact a multitude
of events to come.
Thanks
for reading,
-Pat
12 May 2008
To
the dismay of few people, reports clearly indicate that the Chavez government
is tied to the drug-trade in Colombia. Adding to this, the reports posit that
Chavez had plans to directly support FARC rebels both financially (around $250
million) and with arms (anti-aircraft missiles). Chavez insists that the
documents are fabricated and that it is a US ploy against he and his sympathizers.
Being
that there is truth in what is currently being assessed as valid, this can have
serious implications on a variety of levels. One of the more notable
implications that this assessment could have is how Chavez is viewed by his own
populous. It is not likely that most Venezuelans will believe that the reports
bear any sort of truth. Speculatively, the ones that do believe the reports are
true will be divided into two camps.
In
one of these camps you have the serious Chavez loyalist-leftists who would be
delighted to see their leader supporting the FARC. In the other you have those
who are vehemently opposed to Chavez. Surely we know that drug-trade and FARC
activity has substantially increased in Venezuela in recent years and many have
suggested that Chavez is profiting on these happenings.
In
a recent conversation with a former Caracas US embassy employee and Venezuelan
native, it was made clear to me that he personally was fully convinced of the
validity of the reports and that they came as no surprise.
Realistically,
whether or not this information valid it is not going to change the minds of
any concerned parties. What it will do is serve as a first-rate political tool
for Chavez to use against the US and an equally handy instrument for legitimizing
whatever policies the US government seeks to utilize in opposing the Chavez
government. In all likelihood, we will see a Venezuela that is on the US list
of state sponsors of terrorism.
Chavez
will use this as a rallying cry for his populous against the US and the US will
use it as a means of legitimizing the use of whatever means that they deem
necessary in dealing with the ‘Chavez problem’, if we may call it that. Truly
this is a setback in the relationship that the US has with Venezuela, the hostage
crisis in Colombia, the peace process with the FARC, the ‘War on Drugs’, the
list goes on. All of these factors have real implications for the lives of the
people in Colombia and also on American wallets at a time when they are thin.
Best
regards,
-Pat
